Web and Internet Economics
17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021, Proceedings
(Sprache: Englisch)
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany,...
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Produktinformationen zu „Web and Internet Economics “
Klappentext zu „Web and Internet Economics “
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies.
Inhaltsverzeichnis zu „Web and Internet Economics “
Mechanism Design and Pricing.- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality.- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials.- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing.- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design.- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss.- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances.- Contract Design for A orestation Programs.- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching.- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness.- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals.- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction.- Matching, Markets and Equilibria.- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model.- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis.- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home.- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods.- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem.- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy.- The Platform Design Problem.- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria.- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations.- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations.- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem.- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias.- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment.- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies.- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary.- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice.- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries.- Envy-free division
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ofmulti-layered cakes.- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.
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Bibliographische Angaben
- 2022, 1st ed. 2022, XIV, 558 Seiten, 48 farbige Abbildungen, Maße: 15,5 x 23,5 cm, Kartoniert (TB), Englisch
- Herausgegeben: Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
- Verlag: Springer, Berlin
- ISBN-10: 3030946754
- ISBN-13: 9783030946753
Sprache:
Englisch
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